Foreword by Hart, Christopher Ryan
01_FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 2/16/2005 9:32 AM 
 
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 
Volume 67 Autumn 2004 Number 4 
FOREWORD 
CHRISTOPHER RYAN HART* 
 
This issue is the second of a two-part series—the product of the Fourth Annual 
Public Law Conference at Duke Law School—exploring the premise that “distinctive 
conservative and progressive legal ‘visions’ or ‘ideologies’ vie for influence within 
American jurisprudence.”1   
The first issue focused on topics of public law and constitutional meaning.  Some 
authors critiqued the importance or distinctiveness of the “progressive” and “conser-
vative” labels for the meaning of race,2 for their impact on criminal procedure,3 or for 
their descriptive usefulness in the free speech arena.4  Others questioned whether the 
labels of ideological division are categories that aid constitutional understanding, sug-
gesting alternative understandings or different interpretive techniques.5  Still others 
considered which, if any, any ideological label can best describe the Supreme Court’s 
current jurisprudence6 and whether constitutional theory7—and perhaps even histori-
cal views of the Constitution8— must necessarily be understood as  influenced by 
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ideological perspectives. 
Continuing this inquiry into progressive and conservative visions of legal order-
ing, this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems presents a series of articles that 
explore topics in private law spheres (corporate law and torts), in criminal law, and in 
international law.  The questions animating the specific topics here are tightly con-
nected to the questions animating the previous issue: is the contrast of “progressive” 
versus  “conservative” useful to legal inquiry or understanding?  If so, what might the 
normative consequences be of such definitions?  Whether we can come to any specific 
conclusions about  defining those terms or identifying their normative consequences, 
what other interpretive lenses might help us better understand different spheres of 
law? 
Among the questions raised during the Conference, one question is particularly 
prominent in the articles in this issue: if selecting either a “progressive” or a “conser-
vative” approach to a given sphere of law is normatively attractive, what might be the 
substantive legal implications that flow?  While the Foreword from the previous issue 
in this series explored the application of these “differing descriptions” on fields of law 
other than constitutional and public law in some detail,9 it is worth noting here again 
that although constitutional law receives the most attention in the conservative-
progressive debate, private law and international law provoke no fewer questions re-
garding policy preferences and ideology.  How much do these policy preferences fac-
tor into substantive lawmaking in tort law, corporate law, and international law?  
What would the law look like if decisionmakers adopted different ideologies? 
Examining tort law, Anita Bernstein looks closely at each of these questions.10  
Specifically, Bernstein uses tort reform rhetoric as her jumping-off point, and asks 
whether we can call tort law progressive.11   After defining “progressive” and “con-
servative”—a running theme for the articles in both issues—she examines two sets of 
arguments in detail (both in favor of and against a progressive understanding of tort 
law) to come to a better understanding of how we might consider tort law progres-
sive.12  She concludes, “[t]ort law as practiced is continually poised to challenge rather 
than to sigh in acquiescence,”13 suggesting that through the constant centripetal force 
of litigation, checked by rule-of-law values, “tort law jolts stasis into change.”14 
Andrew Koppelman takes a different approach to the ideological divide in exam-
ining the viability of antidiscrimination laws in the wake of Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale.15  Critiquing what he refers to as the “neolibertarian” view of freedom of asso-
ciation, Koppelman—arguing against the idea that noncommercial associations have 
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an absolute right “to exclude unwanted members”16—seems to imply (without explic-
itly stating) that labeling views of core values like free speech as “conservative” or 
“liberal” papers over a panoply of different views that do not fit neatly into either one 
of these categories.  Koppelman notes the different strands of the “libertarian” model 
informing freedom of speech and association and, while exploring the perpetual ten-
sion between different notions of liberty and equality, reminds us that all these politi-
cal ideologies share a common heritage in the classical liberal tradition.17 
Liberty and equality take on a different meaning in Brenda Sims Blackwell’s and 
Clark D. Cunningham’s article, focusing on the lack of “procedural justice” in the 
criminal justice system and attempting to find ways to “increase the legitimacy of the 
legal process” for criminal defendants.18  They examine a number of different projects 
around the country designed to solve the problems they have identified, focusing pri-
marily on restorative justice programs.  Blackwell and Cunningham see their project 
as bridging the “left” versus “right” distinctions made in arguments over criminal law, 
proposing that the model of restorative justice, by “taking the punishment out of the 
process,” fulfills goals on both the left (making the process itself more fair to criminal 
defendants) and the right (reducing costs to taxpayers and making the streets safer).19 
Moving in a different direction from these case studies, a number of other articles 
subsequently critique the normative basis for the current shareholder-centered model 
of corporate law, and consider whether it—or another model—can be considered 
“progressive.”  Kellye Testy, examining the currently dominant shareholder-centered 
paradigm for understanding corporate law, notes “emerging” progressive models of 
corporate law that stand to challenge the dominant paradigm.20  She argues that a 
“concern . . . over concentration and anti-democratic uses of corporate power” unites 
various progressive views, and makes the case for feminist legal theory as one that 
should inform any progressive corporate law model.21  Adam Winkler agrees that the 
“conservative,” shareholder-centered view of the corporation is dominant, but sug-
gests that progressives need not despair: the “broader law of business” protects pro-
gressive ideals in a way that corporate law and corporation rules do not.22  Taking a 
different view, Kent Greenfield suggests that whatever paradigm replaces the current 
shareholder-centered view of corporate law and governance, the law itself ought to be 
more attuned to democratic values than the current legal regime, dominated as it is by 
Delaware corporate law and the internal affairs doctrine.23  Greenfield makes the case 
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that corporate law will never be fair or democratic—whether or not those are “pro-
gressive” values—so long as one small state continues to dominate substantive corpo-
rate law. 
The progressive-conservative debate takes on a different guise in the international 
law arena.   Although they do not explore the specific question of progressivism or 
conservatism in explicit detail, three articles examine shifts in international law that 
can be thought of as influenced by shifts in ideology and policy preferences, and that 
may lead to changes in our understanding of international law’s substance.  Examin-
ing an area of vital importance in the present geopolitical context, Thomas Lee asks 
whether preemptive war can be justified by the “canonical” norm of sovereign equal-
ity.24  The conclusions he comes to—that the sovereign equality norm withstands the 
shock of present-day geopolitical reality—carries implications for those on both sides 
of the political divide, suggesting that preemptive war may be justified by this interna-
tional law norm, but that it may require a multilateral approach. 
While Thomas Lee looks to defend this canonical norm in the face of a new inter-
national reality, Martin Flaherty argues that new approaches for foreign affairs law 
may be shaking up these normative suppositions.25  Specifically, Flaherty’s project is 
to reinterpret the understanding of history in the scholarly understanding of foreign 
affairs law.  Flaherty observes that recent foreign affairs scholarship and Supreme 
Court opinions have suggested a new internationalist tilt to American law, and argues 
that this “reorientation is firmly grounded in the past.”26  He makes the case that such 
an understanding of history and of current foreign affairs scholarship should pave the 
way for international relations law that, animated by the work of the Founders, is al-
ways forward-looking—or (though he does not use the term) “progressive.” 
Finally, Peter Spiro looks at different paradigms of international relations theory 
and suggests that a different theory—one that looks at non-state actors defined by 
“powers and interest”—might aid us in understanding current interactions between na-
tions.27  In so doing, Spiro advocates using this model to understand “how interna-
tional law might be incorporated into U.S. law,”28 in turn shaping the Constitution and 
public understanding of it.  Though Spiro does not entertain the progressive-
conservative debate explicitly, his article suggests that those labels might not neces-
sarily aid a theoretical understanding of international relations and may undermine at-
tempts to make normative, policy- or ideology-driven assumptions about the role in-
ternational law ought to play in our constitutional culture. 
Together, these articles examine questions both at the center and the periphery of 
the debate over “conservative” and “progressive” legal orders.  Read along with the 
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previous issue of Law & Contemporary Problems, they are part of a vibrant and im-
portant discussion not only about our understanding of what American legal culture is 
and what it ought to be,  but also about the very terms we use in our discussion of that 
culture.  These two issues of Law & Contemporary Problems should add new perspec-
tives to our discourse about the nature of the American polity. 
 
